CVE-2026-54561: Path Traversal

Published Jul 17, 2026
·
Updated

Impact

contextimport passed the caller-supplied filePath directly to fs.readFileSync with no path confinement. A malicious MCP client — or an LLM agent that is prompt-injected into calling the tool — could point filePath at any file readable by the server process, outside any session or export directory:

- Full disclosure (JSON files): a valid-JSON target (e.g. another user's exported session, or a .json credential / service-account file) is parsed and imported into the caller's session, then retrievable verbatim via contextget / contextexport. - Partial disclosure (any file): for a non-JSON target (e.g. /etc/passwd, an SSH key, a .env), JSON.parse throws and V8 includes a snippet of the file's leading bytes in the SyntaxError message, which was returned verbatim to the caller.

Both ../ traversal and absolute paths worked — there was no path confinement of any kind.

In a typical MCP deployment the server runs on the developer's machine, so the reachable set includes other users' exported memory sessions, JSON credential/config files, and (in leading-bytes form) .env files, SSH keys, and /etc/passwd. The trigger is a tool argument, so the realistic threat model is an LLM agent prompt-injected into calling contextimport, or any MCP client connected to the server.

Patches

Fixed in 0.13.0 (PR #36):

- Imports are confined to a server-owned exports directory (<DATADIR>/exports, overridable via MEMORYKEEPEREXPORTDIR), resolved with realpathSync. ../ traversal, absolute paths outside the directory, and symlink escapes are all rejected. - File read and JSON.parse are separate operations; read/parse failures return a generic message and never echo file bytes (the SyntaxError-message leak is gone). The database-write path is likewise generic. - An E2E security regression suite covers the reported arbitrary-read and traversal vectors, plus symlink escape, the directory-prefix boundary, and a no-existence-oracle check.

Workarounds

Upgrade to >= 0.13.0. There is no configuration-only workaround for affected versions.

Resources

- Report: GitHub issue #35 - Fix: PR #36

Credit

Reported by Zhihao Zhang (@mcfly-zzh).

Affected Software

1 affected componentFixes available
npm/mcp-memory-keeper<0.13.0
0.13.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/mcp-memory-keeper to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.13.0
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade MCP server (context_import) to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.13.0Patch PR #36
  3. Compensating control

    If you cannot upgrade immediately, prevent/limit MCP clients from calling the context_import tool from untrusted LLM agents/clients (the trigger is the tool argument filePath, which was not path-confined in affected versions).

Event History

Jul 17, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·07:23 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·07:23 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
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Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-54561?

The severity of CVE-2026-54561 is medium with a score of 6.2.

2

What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-54561?

CVE-2026-54561 is a Path Traversal vulnerability.

3

How do I fix CVE-2026-54561?

To fix CVE-2026-54561, ensure that all file paths provided to the `fs.readFileSync` function are properly validated and confined.

4

What can attackers do with CVE-2026-54561?

With CVE-2026-54561, attackers could potentially read any file on the server that is accessible by the process.

5

Which software is affected by CVE-2026-54561?

CVE-2026-54561 affects the npm package mcp-memory-keeper.

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