CVE-2026-54561: Path Traversal
Impact
contextimport passed the caller-supplied filePath directly to fs.readFileSync with no path confinement. A malicious MCP client — or an LLM agent that is prompt-injected into calling the tool — could point filePath at any file readable by the server process, outside any session or export directory:
- Full disclosure (JSON files): a valid-JSON target (e.g. another user's exported session, or a .json credential / service-account file) is parsed and imported into the caller's session, then retrievable verbatim via contextget / contextexport. - Partial disclosure (any file): for a non-JSON target (e.g. /etc/passwd, an SSH key, a .env), JSON.parse throws and V8 includes a snippet of the file's leading bytes in the SyntaxError message, which was returned verbatim to the caller.
Both ../ traversal and absolute paths worked — there was no path confinement of any kind.
In a typical MCP deployment the server runs on the developer's machine, so the reachable set includes other users' exported memory sessions, JSON credential/config files, and (in leading-bytes form) .env files, SSH keys, and /etc/passwd. The trigger is a tool argument, so the realistic threat model is an LLM agent prompt-injected into calling contextimport, or any MCP client connected to the server.
Patches
Fixed in 0.13.0 (PR #36):
- Imports are confined to a server-owned exports directory (<DATADIR>/exports, overridable via MEMORYKEEPEREXPORTDIR), resolved with realpathSync. ../ traversal, absolute paths outside the directory, and symlink escapes are all rejected. - File read and JSON.parse are separate operations; read/parse failures return a generic message and never echo file bytes (the SyntaxError-message leak is gone). The database-write path is likewise generic. - An E2E security regression suite covers the reported arbitrary-read and traversal vectors, plus symlink escape, the directory-prefix boundary, and a no-existence-oracle check.
Workarounds
Upgrade to >= 0.13.0. There is no configuration-only workaround for affected versions.
Resources
- Report: GitHub issue #35 - Fix: PR #36
Credit
Reported by Zhihao Zhang (@mcfly-zzh).
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/mcp-memory-keeperto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.13.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
MCP server (context_import)to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.13.0Patch PR #36 - Compensating control
If you cannot upgrade immediately, prevent/limit MCP clients from calling the context_import tool from untrusted LLM agents/clients (the trigger is the tool argument filePath, which was not path-confined in affected versions).
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2026-54561?
The severity of CVE-2026-54561 is medium with a score of 6.2.
What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-54561?
CVE-2026-54561 is a Path Traversal vulnerability.
How do I fix CVE-2026-54561?
To fix CVE-2026-54561, ensure that all file paths provided to the `fs.readFileSync` function are properly validated and confined.
What can attackers do with CVE-2026-54561?
With CVE-2026-54561, attackers could potentially read any file on the server that is accessible by the process.
Which software is affected by CVE-2026-54561?
CVE-2026-54561 affects the npm package mcp-memory-keeper.