CVE-2026-4897: Polkit: polkit: denial of service via unbounded input processing through standard input

Polkit: polkit: denial of service via unbounded input processing through standard input

— Microsoft

The helper supports two ways to receive the cookie: via argv[2] when argc == 3, or via stdin when argc == 2. The latter is the path used by the polkit agent when it spawns the setuid helper: it passes only the username and writes the cookie on stdin (to avoid exposing it in process listings, as per CVE-2015-4625). The problematic code is in src/polkitagent/polkitagenthelperprivate.c:

c if (argc == 3) return strdup (argv[2]); else { char ret = NULL; sizet n = 0; ssizet r = getline (&ret, &n, stdin); if (r == -1) { if (!feof (stdin)) perror ("getline"); free (ret); return NULL; } else { gstrchomp (ret); return ret; } }

There is no limit on the length of the line read from stdin. The helper checks that stdin is not a TTY when running as non-root (isatty (STDINFILENO) != 0 → error), but it does not reject other sources such as pipes. Moreover, in all helper variants (PAM, shadow, bsdauth), the isatty check is performed after readcookie() has already returned, so even if the check could somehow catch the attacker's input, the unbounded allocation would have already occurred. A local user can therefore run:

sh No newline: getline() keeps reallocating until OOM or ENOMEM python3 -c "print('A'200000000, end='')" | /usr/lib/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1 $(whoami)

The setuid binary is installed with mode 04755 (see mesonpostinstall.py), so any local user can execute it. This affects all helper variants (PAM, shadow, bsdauth) because they share readcookie() in polkitagenthelperprivate.c. The stdin path was introduced in commit ea544ffc; releases from approximately 0.113 onward that use the setuid helper are affected. (Systems that use only the socket-activated helper and never run the setuid binary with user-controlled stdin are not exposed in practice.)

— Red Hat