CVE-2023-32681: Unintended leak of Proxy-Authorization header in requests

Published May 22, 2023
·
Updated

Impact

Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how rebuildproxies is used to recompute and reattach the Proxy-Authorization header to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has only been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. https://username:password@proxy:8080).

Current vulnerable behavior(s):

1. HTTP → HTTPS: leak 2. HTTPS → HTTP: no leak 3. HTTPS → HTTPS: leak 4. HTTP → HTTP: no leak

For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the Proxy-Authorization header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials.

The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the Proxy-Authorization header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with proxymanagerfor. This will compute the required proxy headers in proxyheaders and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage.

Patches Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager.

For users with custom adapters, this may be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of rebuildproxies doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter.

Workarounds For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround.

You may disable redirects by setting allowredirects to False on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination. import requests r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allowredirects=False)

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals.

Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/) Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@gmail.com)

Other sources

Requests is a HTTP library. Since Requests 2.3.0, Requests has been leaking Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers when redirected to an HTTPS endpoint. This is a product of how we use rebuildproxies to reattach the Proxy-Authorization header to requests. For HTTP connections sent through the tunnel, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the Proxy-Authorization header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into the tunneled request. This results in Requests forwarding proxy credentials to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate sensitive information. This issue has been patched in version 2.31.0.

MITRE

Versions of Requests between v2.3.0 and v2.30.0 are vulnerable to potential forwarding of Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers when following HTTPS redirects.

When proxies are defined with user info (https://user:pass@proxy:8080), Requests will construct a Proxy-Authorization header that is attached to the request to authenticate with the proxy.

In cases where Requests receives a redirect response, it previously reattached the Proxy-Authorization header incorrectly, resulting in the value being sent through the tunneled connection to the destination server. Users who rely on defining their proxy credentials in the URL are strongly encouraged to upgrade to Requests 2.31.0+ to prevent unintentional leakage and rotate their proxy credentials once the change has been fully deployed.

Users who do not use a proxy or do not supply their proxy credentials through the user information portion of their proxy URL are not subject to this vulnerability.

Github Security Advisory

Red Hat

Affected Software

5 affected componentsFixes available
pip/requests>=2.3.0<2.31.0
2.31.0
Python Requests>=2.3.0<2.31.0
Fedoraproject Fedora=37
IBM Db2 Genius Hub<=1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2
IBM Agentics<=1.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/requests to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.31.0
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade requests to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.31.0
  3. Configuration

    Disable redirects on all Requests calls where the proxy credentials might be involved by setting allow_redirects=False (e.g., requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False)).

    Requests allow_redirects = False
  4. Compensating control

    If upgrading immediately is not possible, migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization into a custom adapter (since rebuild_proxies reattachment does not make sense, and Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination).

  5. Operational

    If you supplied proxy credentials in the URL user-info component (e.g., https://username:password@proxy:8080) and redirects may have occurred while running Requests between v2.3.0 and v2.30.0, rotate/revoke those proxy credentials after upgrading to Requests v2.31.0+.

Event History

May 22, 2023
Advisory Published
via GitHub·08:36 PM
May 24, 2023
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·03:06 AM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
May 26, 2023
CVE Published
via MITRE·05:02 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·05:02 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Jul 13, 2026
Data Sourced
via IBM·12:00 AM
DescriptionAffected Software

Parent advisories

This vulnerability appears in the following advisories.

Free Weekly Intel

Don't miss critical vulnerabilities

Join thousands of security professionals who receive our weekly digest of trending CVEs, zero-days, and exploited vulnerabilities.

No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is CVE-2023-32681?

CVE-2023-32681 is a vulnerability in Requests HTTP library that can potentially leak Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers.

2

How does CVE-2023-32681 impact my system?

CVE-2023-32681 can result in the leakage of Proxy-Authorization headers during redirects to an HTTPS origin, potentially exposing sensitive information.

3

What software is affected by CVE-2023-32681?

The following software is affected by CVE-2023-32681: Requests (2.3.0 to 2.31.0), Python Requests (2.3.0 to 2.31.0), Fedora (version 37).

4

What is the severity of CVE-2023-32681?

The severity of CVE-2023-32681 is medium, with a severity score of 6.1.

5

How do I fix CVE-2023-32681?

To fix CVE-2023-32681, upgrade Requests library to version 2.31.0 or higher.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203